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Abstract
The Berle-Means problem - information and incentive asymmetries disrupting relations
between knowledgeable managers and remote investors - has remained a durable issue
engaging researchers since the 1930's.  However, the Berle-Means paradigm - widely-
dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, entrenched managers - is under stress in the wake
of the cross-country evidence presented by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
and their legal approach to corporate control.  
This paper continues to investigate the roles of investor protections and concentrated
ownership by examining firm behaviour in the Netherlands.  Our within country analysis
generates two key results.  First, the role of investor protections emphasized in the legal
approach is not sustained.  Rather, we find that performance is enhanced when the firm is
freed of equity market constraints, a result that we attribute to the relaxation of the myopia
constraints imposed by relatively uninformed investors.  Second, ownership concentration
does not have a discernible impact on firm performance, which may reflect large shareholders'
































    But have we any justification for assuming that those in 
control of a modern corporation will also choose to 
operate it in the interests of the owners? 
     Berle  and  Means  (1932,  p.  113) 
 
 
    ...the stockholders' position, once a controlling factor in 
the running of the enterprise, has declined from extreme 
strength to practical impotence. 
     Berle  and  Means  (1932,  p.  131) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
  The Berle-Means problem -- information and incentive asymmetries 
disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors -- has 
remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930's.  However, the 
Berle-Means paradigm -- widely-dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, 
entrenched managers -- is under stress and of only modest applicability for most 
developed countries.  In a recent paper, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(LLS, 1999), examine the 20 largest firms in 27 wealthy countries, and show that 
concentrated ownership is the norm, not the exception.
1  The Berle-Means paradigm 
is appropriate for the United States and United Kingdom, countries whose legal 
environments provide very good protection of minority shareholders' rights.  LLS' 
cross-country results emphasize that investor protections and concentrated 
ownership are the key elements for understanding how the modern corporation is 
controlled and "how to assure financiers that they get a return on their financial 
investment" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 773).
2  
 
  This paper continues to investigate these two mechanisms of corporate 
control by examining the roles of investor protections and concentrated ownership 
                         
1 See Barca and Becht (2001) and Gugler (2001) for further analysis of concentrated ownership.    
 
2
 Roe (1994) presents an alternative and provocative theory of how political forces created a dispersed 
structure of corporate ownership in the United States.  See Carney (1997) and LLS (1998, Section III) 
for critiques, and Roe (1999) for further elaboration of his thesis.    
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on firm behaviour in the Netherlands.  A within-country analysis complements the 
prior cross-country research because several factors -- taxes and regulations -- can 
be held constant.  Dutch firms are very useful for studying these mechanisms of 
control because several devices exist for circumscribing investor protections that are 
used by many, but not all, firms.  Ownership concentration also ranges widely.   
 
  The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of corporate control 
mechanisms on firm performance.  Section II discusses the system of corporate 
control in the Netherlands, and reviews the roles of three key sets of actors: 
management and supervisory boards, shareowners, and institutions.  The financial 
statement, anti-investor protection, and ownership data are available for 93 firms for 
the period 1992 to 1996.   Section III discusses these data, and documents the 
variation in anti-investor protections and concentrated ownership in the sample.  
Section IV presents the estimation strategy for assessing the impact of anti-investor 
protections and concentrated ownership as corporate control mechanisms.  We 
discuss the ambiguity of these control mechanisms on long-run performance 
(measured by the long-run return on assets computed as a five-year average), and 
the appropriateness of focusing on the cross-section dimension of the data. 
 
   Empirical results are contained in the next two sections.  Section V contains a 
simple test of the substitution hypothesis between anti-investor protections and 
ownership concentration that is an important element in the legal approach to 
corporate governance.  We find no support for the substitution hypothesis in our 
Dutch data.  Rather, it seems that once anti-investor protections are in place, the 
firm is either avoided or abandoned by concentrated owners.  Regression results are 
contained in Section VI.  We uncover a strong positive relation between the absence 
of investor protections and profitability.  That is, as firms are freed from the 
pressure of equity markets, profitability rises.  No systematic relation is uncovered 
for ownership concentration. 
    
  A summary and conclusions are presented in Section VII.  In interpreting 
their results presented in this paper, it is important to keep in mind that this evidence 
is more in the spirit of interesting conditional correlations than definitive tests about 
fundamental causes.  The current research aims to stimulate and direct theoretical 
modeling that will ultimately provide the basis for more formal hypothesis testing.  
Thus, our empirical evidence is intended to inform views of corporate control 
problems and the solutions provided by various control mechanisms. 
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  II.  The Corporate Control System In The Netherlands 
  The Dutch system of corporate control contains three key sets of actors: 
management and supervisory boards, shareowners, and institutions.
3   
 
A.  Management And Supervisory Boards 
  The focal point of the corporate control system is a two-tier board structure 
consisting of a management board (Raad van Bestuur) in charge of the day-to-day 
operations of the firm and a supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen).  The 
supervisory board's scope of influence varies substantially depending on which 
organizational regime the firm adopts.  The structural regime (Structuurregeling) 
described here applies to the majority of public limited liability companies 
(Naamloze Vennootschappen, NV's) listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.  The 
supervisory board has three primary functions:  to appoint (usually for an indefinite 
term), monitor, and dismiss members of the management board (though the latter 
rarely occurs);
4 draft the annual financial statement for presentation at the annual 
shareholders meeting; and approve major business decisions proposed by the 
management board concerning, for example, expansions, acquisitions, 
restructurings, or financing.  
 
  Members of the supervisory board are appointed for four year terms by co-
option, that is, by the incumbent members of the supervisory board.
5  An individual 
can not serve on both the supervisory and management boards of the same 
company.  In practice, the management board has a very large influence on 
appointments to the supervisory board (van der Goot and van het Kaar, 1997).
6  The 
                         
3 Detailed descriptions of the system of corporate control and finance in the Netherlands can be found 
in CPB (1997, Chapter 10), Gelauff and den Broeder (1997), and de Jong, Kabir, Marra, and Röell 
(2001).  We have relied particularly heavily on Gelauff and den Broeder's work in writing this section.  
4 Dutch management board turnover, calculated as the number of management board members leaving 
the firm by other than natural causes and scaled by board size, is approximately 8.0% (van Oijen, 
2000).  This figure is somewhat low compared to those reported for other countries; Kaplan (1994) 
reports turnover rates of 12.0% (excluding cases of death and illness) for the United States and 10.0% 
for Germany.  
 
5 The mean [median] number of members on the supervisory and management boards for our sample 
of firms is 4.95 [5] and 2.95 [3], respectively.  
6 Inside (managerial) ownership of listed firms is unimportant in the Netherlands.  Based on an 
ownership criterion of 5.0%, 19 of 137 firms were owned by insiders sitting on the management 
board and an additional and different 6 firms for those on the supervisory board (de Jong et. al. 
(2001, Table 11).  Majority ownership was achieved by the management board of 5 firms and by 
the supervisory board of 1 firm.  For the 137 firms, average ownership is 4.86% and 1.82% for 
management and supervisory boards, respectively.       
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two-tier board structure in the Netherlands differs substantially from that in 
Germany, where the supervisory board is appointed by the shareholders at the 
annual meeting and exerts substantial independent influence on management.  The 
close relations between management and supervisory boards makes the Dutch two-
tier system somewhat similar to the U.S. system, where executive managers sit on 
the board of directors (comparable to the supervisory board) and the chief executive 
officer often chairs the board of directors.  In sum, the Dutch supervisory board is 
largely advisory, though that counsel may receive more attention depending on the 
background of the advising member. 
 
B.  Shareholders 
  Shareholders/investors exercise control through voting at the annual meeting 
(Algemene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders) and, for large investors, by sitting on 
the supervisory board.  At the annual meeting, the influence of investors is 
circumscribed under the structural regime in two ways.  First, few important issues 
come before the annual meeting:  the financial statement drafted by the supervisory 
board is voted on (amendments are not permitted), nominations for the supervisory 
board may be proposed and rejected, though election is by incumbent members of 
the supervisory board.  Large investors can exert influence by refusing to approve 
the financial statements and supervisory board nominations.   
 
  Second and more devastating to investors' voting rights, management has 
available four potent devices for diluting voting power and separating control rights 
from cash flow rights:  
 
    --  Preference shares ('prefs') have the same voting rights as ordinary 
equity, but have a fixed payout with priority over payouts of ordinary 
dividends.  These shares are frequently held by a continuity foundation 
(Stichting Continuiteit) friendly to the firm's management.  Preference 
shares, which can be issued on a temporary basis, effectively increase 
the voting power of managers.  This anti-investor protection (AIP(1)) is 
used by 66.0% of the firms in our sample.  
 
  --  Tradable depository receipts (TDR's) also separate cash flow and 
control rights.  Under this procedure, the ordinary equity capital is 
deposited at an administrative office (Administratie-kantoor), and 
TDR's are issued (similar to American Depository Receipts issued on 
non-U.S. equity).  TDR's generally entitle the holder to cash flow 
rights, but control rights reside with the administrative office.  This 
anti-investor protection (AIP(2)) is used by 32.0% of the firms in our 
sample.   
    




 --  Priority  shares (Prioriteits-aandelen) carry special voting rights on 
matters such as "proposing or preventing the appointment of particular 
new members of the management and supervisory boards, approving 
the issue of ordinary shares, liquidation of the company or changing the 
articles of association" (Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, p. 67).  The 
issuance of priority shares curtails voting power for extant 
shareholders.  This anti-investor protection (AIP(3)) is used by 24.0% 
of the firms in our sample.   
 
In the face of these three AIP's, shareholders have little reason to pursue 
aggressively their limited tasks granted under the structural regime.  The Dutch 
annual meeting differs radically from its German and U.S. counterparts, where, in 
principle, shareholders have a powerful effect on the course of events primarily by 
electing the supervisory board (or board of directors) and voting on important 
matters brought before shareholders.    
 
  The above AIP's all focus on altering effective voting rights by issuing shares.  
In considering voting rights in the Netherlands, it is important to bear in mind that 
investor protections and the tasks voted upon at the annual meeting are directly 
linked to the applicable organizational regime.  Under other organizational regimes 
available to Dutch firms, shareholders exercise much more influence.  A fourth AIP 
is created by the option that allows firms to choose to be governed according to the 
rules and regulations of the structural regime described above even if they are not 
required to do so by law.
7   
 
  Investor protections are enhanced under the other two other legal regimes 
relevant to public limited liability companies.  Firms that meet the criteria for the 
structural regime but are majority foreign-owned can follow the mitigated structural 
regime (Gewijzigde Structuurregeling).  Under this legal regime, the supervisory 
board's responsibilities for appointing and dismissing members of the management 
board and drafting the annual financial statement are transferred to the annual 
shareholders meeting, enhancing investor protections.  Public limited liability 
companies that do not meet the above criteria can adopt the common legal regime 
(Vennootschapsrecht) for which a supervisory board is optional.  If a supervisory 
board is in place, appointments are determined at the annual meeting, and its only 
                         
7 The majority of Dutch firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are required to follow the 
structural regime because they satisfy all of the following conditions:  the firm is a public limited liability 
company, subscribed capital exceeds 25 million guilders (approximately $12.5 million U.S.), 
employment in the Netherlands exceeds 100, and employees are represented by a works council.      
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major responsibility is to approve major management decisions.
8  All other 
important decisions, especially the appointment of the management board, are made 
at the annual shareholders meeting.  In sum, investor protections are substantially 
enhanced under the mitigated structural and common regimes, which transfer power 
from the supervisory board to the annual meeting.  The voluntary adoption of the 
structural regime can thus be viewed as another device weakening investor 
protections because the structural regime's supervisory board is largely influenced 
by and hence empowers management at the expense of investors.  This anti-investor 
protection (AIP(4)) is used by 25.0% of the firms in our sample.   
 
C.  Institutions 
  The third set of key actors in Dutch corporate governance is Institutions -- 
financial intermediaries, workers councils, and informal networks.  Financial 
Intermediaries also hold equity positions and, as discussed above, shareownership 
per se may have little impact on controlling managers.  However, their equity stakes 
are occasionally large, and they are considered long-term, "patient" investors.  
Consequently, financial intermediaries frequently obtain seats on the supervisory 
board.
9  Furthermore, banks are actively involved in extending short-term credit, and 
thus have a direct and potentially powerful channel of influence on management (cf. 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Section IV.C).  The role of Dutch banks is much greater 
than in the United States, where banks are largely prohibited from owning equity 
and, until very recently, were small by the standards of Continental Europe.  By 
contrast, banks have a long-standing and prominent role on the corporate landscape 
in Germany where they hold large positions in both debt and equity and actively 
serve on, and frequently chair, supervisory boards.  
 
  Employees are represented by a Workers Council (Ondernemings-raad) that 
is voluntary but exists at virtually all large firms.  The works council has some 
influence with and occasional membership on the supervisory board, where usually 
one member represents workers' concerns.  The works council has the same rights 
as shareholders to propose or reject nominations to the supervisory board.  The 
position of the works councils bear some resemblance to that played by organized 
labour in the United States, where union representatives frequently hold a seat on 
the board of directors.  By contrast, legal statutes grant German workers much more 
                         
8 A survey of 180 smaller limited liability companies (with 50-1000 employees) -- who were not legally 
obligated to install a supervisory board but did so voluntarily -- revealed that the main motive for the 
installation was the need for expert advice (Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, pp. 44-45).  
9 Pension funds and insurance companies own more equity in the Netherlands than in Germany (13.4% 
vs. 7.1%) but much less than their U.S. counterparts (24.7%). (Data are for 1993, and are taken from 
Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, p. 46).     
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nominal influence on corporate affairs, including between one-third to one-half of 
the seats on the supervisory board.
10  However, the chair of the German supervisory 
board holds the tie-breaking vote, and this position is usually held by a person 
(frequently a banker) sympathetic to management's concerns. 
 
  Networks of outside board members are potentially importantly for control.   
These individuals hold positions on the management and supervisory boards of 
several companies, and/or they are "distinguished experts" drawn from the ranks of 
politicians, civil servants, lawyers, professors, and former directors.   With their 
perspective and experience, these outside board members may provide valuable 
advice to firms.     
 
D.  Summary 
  Dutch firms are affected by a variety of different corporate control 
mechanisms.  The extent of investor protections and concentrated ownership vary 
across firms, and this variation will be used in the empirical work to assess the 
impacts of these corporate control mechanisms on firm performance.  Financial 
intermediaries, workers councils, and informal networks are additional control 
mechanisms that may also affect corporate governance and firm performance, but 
they will not be analyzed further in this study.     
 
 
III.  The Dataset 
  We draw on two sources to construct the variables used in our empirical 
analysis.  Our sample extends from 1992-1996, unless otherwise noted.  Financial 
statement data are obtained from the AMADEUS/REACH database covering 165 
Dutch firms.  We focus only on firms involved in manufacturing, omitting financial 
and service firms.  The data will be time-averaged to form the cross-section used in 
the econometric work.  Thus, a balanced panel is highly desirable, and we omit 
firms involved in mergers or takeovers.  Two firms are excluded:  Hunter Douglas 
because of erratic data and Royal Dutch Shell because it is registered in both the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands.  These restrictions lead to a final sample 





                         
10 German co-determination laws require that, for stock companies with 500 or more employees, one-
third of the seats on the supervisory board must be held by persons elected by the employees.  The 
fraction increases to one-half for stock companies with 2,000 or more employees.    
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  CFA         =  Cash flow (operating income plus depreciation)  /  TA;   
 
  CVCFA         =  Coefficient of variation of CFA (the standard deviation 
divided by the mean); 
 
  DIVERSITY    =  The percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which 
the firm is involved outside its core business, measured by 
revenues; 
   
  LEVERAGE  =  (TA less stockholders equity)  /  TA; 
 
  PROF      =  Profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses)   
    /     T A ;  
  
  SIZE      =  The natural logarithm of TA; 
 
  TA      =  Total assets less depreciation. 
 
 
For each of the 93 firms, these variables are averaged from 1992 to 1996.
11  The 
medians (m), means (µ), and standard deviations (σ) are presented in Table I.

















                         
11 For those series analyzed as ratios, the ratios are computed and then summed over time; that is, ratioi 
= Σt (ai,t / bi,t).  All of the ratios are defined so that bi,t is far from zero.  This procedure obviates the 
need for price deflators, which are unavailable on a firm-specific basis.   
    






The entries are the median (m), mean (µ), and standard deviation (σ) of the indicated variable 
averaged from 1992 to 1996 for each of the 93 firms.  CFA is cash flow (operating income plus 
depreciation) / TA, where TA is total assets less depreciation; CVCFA is the coefficient of 
variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) of CFA; DIVERSITY  is the percentage of 
two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved outside its core business, measured by 
revenues; LEV is (TA less stockholders equity) / TA; OWN(L) is the ownership stake of the 
largest shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity; PROF is profitability 
(before-tax profits plus financial expenses) / TA; SIZE is the natural logarithm of TA.  
 
            Variable                        Median (m)                     Mean (µ)            Standard Deviation (σ) 
                                                      (1)                                 (2)                                  (3) 
CFA 75.636  406.331  1214.386 
CFACV 0.216  0.286  0.286 
DIVERSITY 1.700  1.988  2.052 
LEV 0.620 0.605 0.124 
OWN(L) 15.000  25.118  21.920 
PROF 9.072 9.727 4.775 
SIZE 5.972 6.094 1.655 
 
 
  Data for anti-investor protections (AIP's) and ownership concentration 
(OWN's) for the firm are obtained from the Monitoring Commissie Corporate 
Governance (1998).  The AIP's and two of the ownership variables enter as 
indicator variables.  In those rare cases where the defining characteristic (e.g., 
issuing preference shares) changes over the sample, the indicator is determined by 
the most frequent value of the characteristic.  The ownership stake (OWN(L))  is a 
continuous variable.  The variables are defined as follows:    
 
  AIP(1)    =  1 if a firm issues preference shares;  
    0   e l s e w i s e .    
 
  AIP(2)    =  1 if the percentage of shares issued as tradable depository 
receipts is equal to or greater than 50.0%; 0 elsewise. 
 
  AIP(3)    =  1 if a firm issues priority shares;  
    0   e l s e w i s e .  
 
  AIP(4)    =  1 if a firm is not required to implement the structural 
regime, but does so voluntarily; 
    0   e l s e w i s e .     
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  OWN(L)      =  Ownership stake of the largest shareholder stated as a 
percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity. 
 
  OWN(20)    =  1 if OWN(L)  >  0.20; 0 elsewise.  
 
  OWN(40)    =  1 if OWN(L)  >  0.40; 0 elsewise.  
 
 
  As shown in the first row of Table II, the largest shareholder (as measured by 
(OWN(L)) controls more than 20% of outstanding ordinary equity for over one-half 
of the firms.  Fifteen percent of the firms are majority owned.  Table II also includes 
information on the distribution of the AIP's across categories of ownership 
concentration.  The first row contains the distribution for all 93 firms,  Relative to  




DISTRIBUTION OF ANTI-INVESTOR PROTECTIONS 
ACROSS LEVELS OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
 
The entries are the number of firms that use a given anti-investor protection (AIP).  Column 1 
contains the total number of firms using a given AIP; the remaining entries in a given row 
distribute this total across levels of ownership concentration.  All of the AIP's are indicator 
variables taking a value of 1 for the criteria below and zero elsewise: AIP(1)=1 if a firm issues 
preference shares; AIP(2)=1 if the percentage of shares issued as tradable depository receipts is 
equal to or greater than 50%; AIP(3)=1 if a firm issues priority shares; AIP(4)=1 if a firm is not 
required to implement the structural regime, but does so voluntarily.  See Section II.B for further 
discussion of the AIP's.  Ownership concentration is measured by the ownership stake of the 
largest shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary equity (OWN(L)).    
 
 
                     Number                                Ownership Concentration (OWN(L))                        . 
                     Of Firms         0-5             5-10           10-20          20-40          40-50            50+ 
                         (1)              (2)               (3)               (4)              (5)               (6)              (7) 
All  Firms  93 2 23  28  19 7 14 
        
AIP(1)  61 2 20  20  12 3  4 
AIP(2)  30 0 12 8  8  2  0 
AIP(3)  22  1 5 8 2 1 5 
AIP(4)  23  1 6 5 7 2 2 
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IV.  Estimation Strategy 
  Our estimation strategy is to assess corporate control mechanisms by their 
impact on economic performance.  The links between good governance and good 
performance are well established.  As argued by Berle and Means, the incentives of 
managers controlling the firm differ from those of owners and, in large, publicly held 
corporations, most owners/investors have little incentive to expend resources to 
ensure that the firm is operated in their interests.  Consequently, resources may be 
directed to activities that benefit managers rather then firm performance.  Jensen 
(1986) has emphasized that these agency problems are likely to become particularly 
severe when managers have an abundance of internal resources relative to 
investment opportunities (i.e., "Free Cash Flow").  The important consequence is 
that the Berle-Means agency problem may lead the firm to a sub-optimal allocation 
of resources that compromise performance.   
 
   Investment decisions within the firm may also be adversely affected by undue 
pressure from equity investors.  The "Managerial Myopia" model argues that equity 
markets may not allocate capital efficiently because of an absence of stable, 
dedicated investors with a long-term interest in the firm's performance.  Formal 
models of strategic behaviour establish that, when inside managers know more 
about the firm's operations than outside owners, high hurdle rates that distort 
investment can occur because of a premium for signal jamming, obfuscation, or 
hidden action.  Rather than being ameliorative, equity market pressures force 
management into an undue focus on boosting short-term earnings and avoiding 
takeover threats at the expense of long-run performance.
12  
 
  In sum, agency and myopia problems adversely affect firms, and corporate 
control mechanisms that reduce the impact of these problems should be associated 
with better performance.  However, as the myopia model suggests, the link between 
investor protections and performance is ambiguous.  While a more active role for 
investors may mitigate agency conflicts, myopia problems may be exacerbated.   
 
  A similar ambiguity affects concentrated ownership.  Concentrated ownership 
is a direct solution to the agency problems that arise from the separation of 
ownership from control.  With a sufficiently large equity stake in the firm, investors 
have the incentive to invest resources in monitoring and disciplining managers and 
thus reducing agency problems.  However, concentrated owners may also use their 
controlling position to expropriate benefits for themselves at the expense of small 
                         
12
 For discussions of capital allocation systems suffering from short-termism, see de Jong (1996) for 
the Netherlands and Porter (1992) for the United States.  See Bohlin (1997) for an excellent survey of 
formal models of managerial incentives and investment biases. 
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shareholders by, for example, diverting resources towards other firms in which they 
have substantial cash flow rights.  Thus, the lower costs of managerial agency 
problems will be balanced against the higher agency costs of expropriation.  As a 
result of these conflicting tendencies, the effects of AIP's and concentrated 
ownership on firm performance are ambiguous theoretically.  Their ultimate impact 
is an empirical matter.   
 
  Firm performance is measured by the long-run return on assets computed as a 
five-year average.  This computation exhausts the time dimension of our data, and 
thus our empirical work is based on cross-section analyses.  Since the questions 
motivating this study focus on long-run relations among profitability and various 
corporate control mechanisms, focusing on the cross-section dimension of the data 
is appropriate.  Moreover, there is very little time-series variation in the AIP's and 
concentrated ownership.  As a consequence of the near-constancy of the corporate 
control variables over our sample period, we treat them as exogenous regressors.
13   
Finally, financial market data do not provide a good measure of the impact of 
corporate control variables on economic performance.  In a sense, asset prices are 
too good a measure because they capitalize the effects of favorable/unfavorable 
corporate governance policies.  Hence, the financial return for a firm serving 
shareholders' interests may differ little from the financial return for a firm with 
serious and unresolved corporate governance problems.  The Brainard-Tobin Q is 
also not a useful measure because it gravitates toward its equilibrium value of unity, 
and it will be difficult to discern the impacts of control variables.  Financial data 
would be useful to examine firms switching control mechanisms over time but, such 




V.  The Substitution Hypothesis 
  An important implication of the legal approach to corporate governance is 
that concentrated ownership substitutes for poor investor protections.  This relation 
has been confirmed in the cross-country comparisons reported in LLSV (1998) and 
LLS (1999).  For our within-country analysis, the comparable implication is that  
the AIP's will be positively correlated with ownership concentration.
    
 
  Table III evaluates this hypotheses in terms of correlation coefficients for 
various AIP's and three measures of ownership concentration -- the value of the 
largest stake (OWN(L)) and indicator variables set to unity if the largest stake 
                         
13 A deeper understanding of corporate control issues requires us to model the adoption of 
corporate control mechanisms, but this important task is not tackled in this paper.  
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exceeds 20.0% (OWN(20)) or 40.0% (OWN(40)).  There is scant evidence of a 
positive relation.
14  Rather, in the case of preference shares or tradable depository 
receipts, the correlations are negative and significant at the 1.0% level.  Thus, the 
substitution hypothesis receives little support.   
 
TABLE III 
CORRELATION OF ANTI-INVESTOR PROTECTIONS 
AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
 
The entries are the correlation coefficients between anti-investor protections (AIP's) and measures 
of ownership concentration (OWN's).  All of the AIP's are indicator variables taking a value of 1 
for the criteria below and zero elsewise: AIP(1)=1 if a firm issues preference shares; AIP(2)=1 if 
the percentage of shares issued as tradable depository receipts is equal to or greater than 50%; 
AIP(3)=1 if a firm issues priority shares; AIP(4)=1 if a firm is not required to implement the 
structural regime, but does so voluntarily.  Ownership concentration is measured by the 
ownership stake of the largest shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary 
equity (OWN(L)) or indicator variables, OWN(20) and OWN(40), taking a value of 1 for the 
criteria below and zero elsewise: OWN(20)=1 if OWN(L) > 0.20; OWN(40)=1 if OWN(L) > 
0.40.  For a sample of 93 firms, the critical values for the null hypothesis of no correlation are 
0.170, 0.201, and 0.261 for the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.  The figures in 
bold are those used to evaluate the substitution hypothesis. 
 
                       AIP(1)         AIP(2)        AIP(3)        AIP(4)      OWN(L)    OWN(20)   OWN(40) 
                         (1)               (2)              (3)               (4)               (5)              (6)              (7) 
AIP(1)    1.000        
AIP(2)   0.112   1.000           
AIP(3)  -0.023  -0.222    1.000      
AIP(4)  -0.005  -0.022   0.033   1.000       
OWN(L)  -0.413 -0.291   0.020 -0.027  1.000     
OWN(20)  -0.348  -0.167  -0.063   0.018    0.794   1.000   
OWN(40)  -0.367  -0.263    0.062  -0.071   0.860   0.635   1.000 
 
 
  The above statement of the substitution hypothesis may not be sufficiently 
sensitive to a key maintained assumption.  Who moves first: concentrated owners or 
management boards?
15  If concentrated owners move first by taking a dominant 
                         
14 The reported results for AIP(2) may be biased toward a positive correlation.  Under AIP(2), 
the percentage of shares held by an administrative office may be sufficiently large that the firm is 
also classified as a concentrated owner.  In this case, AIP(2) and OWN(L) would be positively 
correlated, though such a correlation does not reflect a substitution of governance mechanisms.  
This bias does not affect the conclusion to be drawn about the substitution hypothesis in Table III.      
 
15 We thank our reviewer for highlighting the importance of these additional assumptions. .   
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equity position, the anticipated correlation in the data would be reversed.  Given that 
concentrated owners have an incentive to adopt good corporate governance 
practices, we might expect the AIP's to be eliminated.  Under this scenario, 
ownership concentration would be negatively correlated with the AIP's.   
 
  As indicated by the analysis of the Dutch corporate governance system in 
Section II, management boards have a great deal of autonomy in adopting anti-
investor protections, and it appears more accurate to assume that management 
boards "move first."  Under this assumption, two scenarios might then unfold.  First, 
consistent with the substitution hypothesis, a firm shielded from investors by the 
AIP's might be very inefficient, and hence tempting for a owner to accumulate a 
large equity stake so that the potential efficiency gains are realized.  This scenario 
would yield a positive correlation between AIP's and concentrated owners.  Second, 
outside investors, regardless of the size of their equity stake, may find AIP-shielded 
firm undesirable.  Under this scenario, potentially large shareholders would avoid 
and existing large shareholders would abandon the firm, and we would expect a 
negative correlation between the AIP's and concentrated ownership.    
 
  While simple correlations presented in Table III should not be 
overinterpreted, it appears that once managers compromise investor protections with 
AIP's , large shareholders either avoid or abandon the firm to its managers.  In this 
initial analysis, concentrated ownership does not appear to play an ameliorative role 
in Dutch corporate governance.   
 
 
VI.  Firm Performance, Investor Protections, And Concentrated Ownership 
  The roles of investor protections and concentrated ownership as corporate 
governance mechanisms are assessed in terms of their impact on long-run 
profitability.  We begin our analysis by establishing a benchmark regression without 
any governing mechanisms but containing several conditioning variables -- the 
coefficient of variation of cash flow (CVCFA), a measure of the diversity of the 
firm's lines of business (DIVERSITY), leverage (LEVERAGE), a measure of firm 
size (SIZE), and seven industry dummies (not reported).
16  All variables are five-
year averages.  As shown in column 1 of Table IV, only LEVERAGE is statistically 
significant at conventional levels (as well as most of the industry dummies), an 
effect that can be interpreted as reflecting the adverse effects of finance constraints 
in external capital markets or as a signal of maturity (since older firms tend to be 
both more highly levered and less profitable than younger firms). 
 
                         
16 The explicit equation specification is presented in the notes to Tables IV-VI.   
    




THE ROLE OF ANTI-INVESTOR PROTECTIONS 
 
The parameter estimates are based on the following equation:   
 
PROF  =  b0 + b1*AIP' + b2*CVCFA + b3*DIVERSITY 
+  b4*LEVERAGE  + b5*SIZE +  Σj dj*IDUMj + e, 
where PROF is profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses) / TA, the latter defined as 
total assets less depreciation; AIP' is the indicated combination in Panel A of the Anti-Investor 
Protection variables -- AIP(1)=1 if a firm issues preference shares; AIP(2)=1 if the percentage of 
shares issued as tradable depository receipts is equal to or greater than 50%; AIP(3)=1 if a firm 
issues priority shares;  CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by 
the mean) of CFA, the latter defined as cash flow (operating income plus depreciation) divided by 
TA; DIVERSITY is the percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved 
outside its core business, measured by revenues; LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders equity) / 
TA; SIZE is the natural logarithm of TA; IDUMj is a dummy for the jth industry; e is an error 
term.  The b's and d's are estimated by ordinary least squares.  Standard errors in parentheses are 
heteroscedastic-consistent.  RSS is the residual sum of squares raised to 10
-3.    
 
                                                     (1)                  (2)                (3)                 (4)                (5) 
A.  Anti-Investor Protections       
AIP(1) or AIP(2) or AIP(3)    2.408 
(1.241) 
   
AIP(1) or AIP(2)       0.282 
(1.336) 
  
AIP(1) or AIP(3)        2.184 
(1.047) 
 
AIP(2) or AIP(3) 
 
     2.776 
(1.083) 























































C.  Statistics       
Adjusted R
2  0.166 0.197 0.157 0.196 0.237 
RSS  1.540 1.465 1.539 1.466 1.392 
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  The remaining entries in Table IV examine the impact of three anti-investor 
protections that depend on share issuance -- preference shares (AIP(1)), tradable 
depository receipts (AIP(2)), or priority shares (AIP(3)).  We begin by allowing for 
the broadest possible scope for the AIP's; if a firm uses any one of these three AIP's, 
then a dummy variable is one.  As shown in column 2, the AIP's have a substantial 
positive impact on firm performance that is both statistically and economically 
significant.  In the latter regard, firms that have one or more of these AIP's are 25% 
more profitable than the complimentary class of firms.
17  The remaining entries 
consider two of the AIP's at time, and the issuance of priority shares (AIP(3)) has 
the most consistent positive impact on profitability.    
 
  Table V evaluates the impact of the fourth AIP, the voluntarily adoption of 
the structural regime (AIP(4)).  As shown in column 1, firms that transfer power 
away from the annual meeting to the management and supervisory boards are one-
third more profitable than the average sample firm.  Similar statistically significant 
results hold in columns 2-4, where AIP(4) is interacted with the other AIP's.    
 
  The precisely estimated and economically important positive effects of AIP's 
on profitability run counter to the legal approach to corporate governance.  The 
results in Tables IV and V cast some doubt on the prevailing view that robust stock 
markets are the key to robust firm performance.   
 
  Many papers have argued that ownership concentration will attenuate agency 
problems.  Given the wide variation in ownership concentration in the Netherlands 
(cf. Table II), this issue can be explored with our data.  Table VI contains several 
specifications using different measures of ownership concentration -- the ownership 
stake of the largest shareholder stated as a percentage of all outstanding ordinary 
equity (OWN(L)) entered as a linear term, as both linear and quadratic terms or as 
indicator variables, OWN(20), or OWN(40).  For the Dutch firms in our sample, 
there is little systematic relation between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, and little support for the proposition that ownership concentration 









                         
17 One-third of the firms in our sample do not use AIP(1), AIP(2), or AIP(3).   
    




THE ROLE OF ANTI-INVESTOR PROTECTIONS 
 
The parameter estimates are based on the following equation:   
 
PROF  =  b0 + b1*AIP' + b2*CVCFA + b3*DIVERSITY 
+  b4*LEVERAGE  + b5*SIZE +  Σj dj*IDUMj + e, 
where PROF is profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses) / TA, the latter defined as 
total assets less depreciation; AIP' is the indicated combination in Panel A of the Anti-Investor 
Protection variables -- AIP(1)=1 if a firm issues preference shares; AIP(2)=1 if the percentage of 
shares issued as tradable depository receipts is equal to or greater than 50%; AIP(3)=1 if a firm 
issues priority shares; AIP(4)=1 if a firm is not required to implement the structural regime, but 
does so voluntarily; CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the 
mean) of CFA, the latter defined as cash flow (operating income plus depreciation) divided by 
TA; DIVERSITY is the percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved 
outside its core business, measured by revenues; LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders equity) / 
TA; SIZE is the natural logarithm of TA; IDUMj is a dummy for the jth industry; e is an error 
term.  The b's and d's are estimated by ordinary least squares.  Standard errors in parentheses are 
heteroscedastic-consistent.  RSS is the residual sum of squares raised to 10
-3.    
 
                                                     (1)                  (2)                (3)                 (4)                
A.  Anti-Investor Protections      
AIP(4)    3.312 
(1.318) 
   
AIP(4) and AIP(1)     2.205 
(1.527) 
  
AIP(4) and AIP(2) 
 
   3.788 
(2.113) 
  
AIP(4) and AIP(3) 
 
    6.214 
(2.861) 













































C.  Statistics      
Adjusted R
2  0.247 0.186 0.197 0.266 
RSS  1.374 1.485 1.464 1.338    




THE ROLE OF CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP  
 
The parameter estimates are based on the following equation:   
 
PROF  =  b0 + b1*OWN' + b2*CVCFA + b3*DIVERSITY 
+  b4*LEVERAGE  + b5*SIZE +  Σj dj*IDUMj + e, 
where PROF is profitability (before-tax profits plus financial expenses) / TA, the latter defined as 
total assets less depreciation; OWN' is the indicated measure of concentrated ownership in Panel 
A; CVCFA is the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) of CFA, the 
latter defined as cash flow (operating income plus depreciation) divided by TA; DIVERSITY is 
the percentage of two-digit industrial activity in which the firm is involved outside its core 
business, measured by revenues; LEVERAGE is (TA less stockholders equity) / TA; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of TA; IDUMj is a dummy for the jth industry; e is an error term.  The b's and 
d's are estimated by ordinary least squares.  Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic-
consistent.  RSS is the residual sum of squares raised to 10
-3.    
 
                                                      (1)                  (2)                (3)                 (4)               







2     0.001 
(0.001) 
  





    0.315 
(1.296) 













































C.  Statistics      
Adjusted R
2  0.158 0.152 0.161 0.157 
RSS  1.536 1.527 1.530 1.538 
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V.  Summary And Conclusions 
  Recent research in corporate governance has reaffirmed the importance of the 
Berle-Means problem of pervasive agency problems, but has also exposed an 
important fault line in the Berle-Means paradigm -- the assumption of small and 
uninformed investors.  The emerging legal approach to corporate governance 
highlights that the assumption of small investors is not applicable in most 
industrialized countries, and emphasizes the importance of investor protections and 
ownership concentration as complementary means for solving governance problems.  
To date, most of the empirical work has been cross-country.   
 
  This paper uses the interesting institutional features in the Dutch economy to 
undertake a within country analysis.  Two key conclusions emerge.  First, the role of 
investor protections emphasized in the legal approach is not sustained.  Rather, we 
find that performance is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market 
constraints.  We attribute this to the relaxation of the myopia constraints that can be 
imposed by relatively uninformed investors.  Second, ownership concentration does 
not have a discernible impact on firm performance.  Our results indicate that 
concentrated ownership substituted with AIP's, a result consistent with potentially 
large shareholders avoiding or abandoning firms with anti-investor protections.  In 
regression models of profitability, we find no systematic effect of concentrated 
ownership, which may reflect the tension between the lower costs of managerial 
agency problems versus the higher agency costs of expropriation.   
 
   These conclusions concerning investor protections and concentrated 
ownership should be viewed as preliminary.  Two important caveats remain.  First, 
as is well know, results for one country may not be applicable outside its borders.  
Second, we need a better understanding of the forces leading to the adoption of 
AIP's and concentrated ownership.  In this study, the adoption was taken as 
exogenous because of the stability of the corporate control variables over our 
sample.  Nonetheless, we would like to have a better appreciation of the forces at 
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